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THE LAW OF NATURE AND THE EARLY HISTORY
OF UNENUMERATED RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES
R. H. Helmholz
This Paper seeks to make a modest contribution to the topic of
unenumerated rights in American constitutional law by examining
the role that natural law played in our legal system at the time of the
founding of the Republic-a period here taken, largely for the sake
of convenience, to run from the 1 7 90s through the 1820s. The Pa-
per's focus is on case law, rather than legal theory or constitutional
doctrine, although I have tried to say enough about the law of nature
as it was understood at the time to put the cases into their intellectual
context. Whether the evidence presented here makes any real im-
pact on current controversies about unenumerated rights is not easy
to say. Perhaps not. This, however, is a separate question, and except
for a hesitant word at the end, this Paper does not address it. I have
sought only to discover what role natural law played in day-to-day ju-
risprudence during the nation's early years and to relate this evi-
dence to the theme of this Conference. In other words, the question
being discussed is whether-and in what ways-natural law thinking
had any impact on the creation and protection of civil and human
rights, drawing most of the evidence from the early federal and state
reports.
I. THE LAW OF NATURE C. 1800
In 1800, the law of nature held an established place in the think-
ing of lawyers throughout the western world, including England and
the American Republic. Complexities aside, it was widely assumed
that certain general principles of justice were part of human nature,
formed within us by God. These principles were common to all men
everywhere, they were immutable, and they provided the necessary
foundation of all human law. Although the limited character of
man's understanding prevented him from knowing them fully, the
general principles were accessible in part through human reason,
study, and observation.' Many were stated in venerable legal max-
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ims. 2 By 1800, these assumptions had given birth to a scholarly litera-
ture of vast proportions in which the main features of the law of na-
ture were elaborated and some of their consequences worked out.
In practical jurisprudence, the law of nature was thought to play a
basic but limited role. A common formulation held that all law could
be divided into separate categories. Divine law, natural law, the law
of nations, and positive law were the most widely discussed, although
additions and modifications were possible-indeed inevitable-given
the predilection for speculation and classification common within the
learned traditions of the European ius commune. For purposes of this
Paper, however, the significant idea was that positive law was and
should always be based upon the law of nature. That is, natural law
"underlay" the positive law. The positive law gave specific expression
to what was stated more abstractly in the law of nature, and the posi-
tive law also added sanctions to it.3 Normally, the natural law did not
dictate the actual content of positive law; that was a matter for choice
on the part of the community or the legislator. But it did establish a
direction. It did set limits. Any law, custom, statute, or decision
could be tested against the law of nature; if that law were out of step
with the tenets of natural law, then something had gone wrong. Posi-
tive law, whether based on statute or custom, should stand in har-
mony with the law of nature. This was a fundamental assumption of
the jurists. It provided a point of reference.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, natural law lost its
hold on the common assumptions of most lawyers.4 As one recent
commentator put it, "scientific investigation did not favour vague and
unprovable hypotheses,,5 and natural law came to be regarded as just
such a hypothesis. To hard-headed lawyers, the law of nature began
law as "the will of the Creator, manifested by its conformity to reason, and by its utility to his
creatures");JAMES TYRRELL, A BRIEF DISQUISITION OF THE LAW OF NATURE 5 (1692) (noting that
we discover the principles of the law of nature when we "contemplate this [slystem of [t]hings,
called the [viisible [wlorld, but more especially GOD, as its [c]reator and [g]overnour"); see also
NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW 60-83 (1990) (re-
counting the view that human law was subordinate to natural law because it was derived from
divine law); KJELL k. MODER, SAMUEL PUFENDORF AND THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT 27-29
(2005) (discussing "Pufendort's double role as teacher of natural law and a historian").
2 See PETER STEIN, REGULAE IURIS: FROMJURISTIC RULES TO LEGAL MAXIMS 177-78 (1966)
(discussing the development of rules and maxims in the practice of the law).
See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 57-58 (1823) ("The laws now in question are
founded upon that great law of nature .... [They] are but modifications of that superior law.");
Anton-Hermann Chroust, On the Nature of Natural Law, in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHIES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 70, 75 (Paul Sayre ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1981) (1947) (describing positive law as a "'mode'" in which natural law "manifests itself em-
pirically").
4 See, e.g., ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 266-72 (1984)
(illustrating the rejection of natural law by practitioners and American Renaissance authors).
5 DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 870 (1980).
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to seem no more real than a "dream" invented by men, and by the
end of the century, men were awake.6 There have been moments
since that time when it looked as though natural law might stage a
comeback.7 But those moments passed. The law of nature still has
its adherents, but at least to a (relatively) neutral observer it appears
to have disappeared from the mainstream of American jurispru-
dence. 9 Today, arguments similar to those that were characteristic of
the law of nature are often placed under some other, seemingly
sounder, legal rubric, ° and more often than not, judges seek to dis-
tance themselves from the supposition that they are applying reason-
ing drawn from the natural law." No entry for "law of nature" ap-
pears in the index of most recent constitutional law treatises, or even
many accounts of American constitutional history."
This was far from having been the situation in 1800. Or 1830.
During the early years of our Republic, the existence and relevance of
natural law was taken for granted by virtually all serious writers about
the law.' 3 Its reality was assumed as a matter of course. This was true
among the English jurists who were most influential in the colonies.
Coke, Selden, and Blackstone all subscribed to it. They also made
6 R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAw 141 (D.E.L. Johns-
ton trans., 1992) (1988); see also RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 250-52 (1977) (demonstrating the retreat
from natural law because it necessarily incorporated extraconstitutional power).
7 See generally CHARLES G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930);
HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW: A STUDY IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHY (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 1947).
8 RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 177-97 (1999). In particular,
Primus noted many articles which embraced natural law or other forms of foundational rights
theory. Id. at 184 n.13.
9 The current status of natural law and some of the ambiguities inherent in the tradition
are usefully discussed in Brian Bix, Natural Law: The Modern Tradition, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OFJURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 61 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002).
to The history of "substantive due process" appears to be one example. See DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 48
(1985); see also Thomas L. Haskell, The Curious Persistence of Rights Talk in the "Age of Interpreta-
tion," in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 324 (David Thelen ed., 1988).
11 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 734 (1999) ("[T]he dissent's attribution of our rea-
soning and conclusions to natural law.., is simply inaccurate."); see also Stephen Presser, Should
a Supreme Court Justice Apply Natural Law?: Lessons from the Earliest Federal Judges, 5 BENCHMARK
103 (1993) (explaining why Supreme CourtJustices are reluctant to invoke natural law).
See, e.g., MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN
AMERICAN CULTURE (1986); 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2002).
13 See, e.g., ERNEST BARKER, Natural Law and the American Revolution, in TRADITIONS OF
CMLITY 263 (1948); BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT,JR., AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL
LAw (1931).
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use of it. Natural law laid its hand on some of the most famous trea-
tises and decided cases of the common law.
14
In the new American Republic, as in England, natural law was
readily accepted as a valid source of law. It appeared in a variety of
circumstances. The law of nature was referred to as a source of rights
in the Declaration of Independence and The Federalist.1 5 It appeared in
early state constitutions. It was mentioned with approbation by
many of our Founding Fathers and leading lawyers of the time-John
Adams (1735-1826), John Quincy Adams (1767-1848),'8 Samuel
Adams (1722-1803) ,9 Nathaniel Chipman (1752-1843) ,20 Alexander
Hamilton (1757-1804),21 David Hoffman (1784-1854),22 John Jay
(1745-1829),23 Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), 24 James Kent (1763-
1847) Hugh Swinton Legar6 (1797-1843),6 James Madison (1751-
14 See FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 107-38 (1904) (dedicating
a section to the law of reason); J. w. TUBBS, THE COMMON LAW MIND: MEDIEVAL AND EARLY
MODERN CONCEPTIONS 72-76, 159 (2000) (analyzing the authority of natural law); R. H. Helm-
holz, Natural Law and Human Rights in English Law: From Bracton to Blackstone, 3 AVE MARIA L.
REV. 1, 5-11 (2005) (listing jurists who described natural law as a legitimate basis for English
common law); D. J. Ibbetson, Natural Law and Common Law, 5 EDINBURGH L. REV. 4 (2001) (dis-
cussing the "fervour" of natural law thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
15 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (asserting that colonists were
called upon by "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" to separate from Great Britain); THE
FEDERALIST, No. 43, at 297 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (referring to "the
transcendent law of nature" that declares the aim of all government to rest on the self-
preservation of society). See generally Dieter Grimm, Europiiisches Naturrecht und Amerikanische
Revolution, 3 IuS COMMUNE 120 (1970).16 See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (asserting "[t]hat all men are by nature equally free and in-
dependent and have certain inherent rights").
17 See 1 LEGAL PAPERS OFJOHN ADAMS 3 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (con-
cerning Adams's study of Lex Naturae as a young man).
18 See JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE SOCIAL COMPACT, EXEMPLIFIED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 25 (1842) (discussing marriage and marital contracts
as founded upon the law of nature).
19 See I THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 46-47 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1904) (asserting
that "[t]he Rights of Nature are happily interwoven in the British Constitution").
20 See NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT: A TREATISE ON FREE INSTITUTIONS
158-70 (1833) (devoting this chapter to the law of nature).
21 See Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 21 (MortonJ. Frisch ed., 1985) (claiming a natural right to liberty).
See DAVID HOFFMAN, SYLLABUS OF A COURSE OF LECTURES 14-16 (1821) (defining and out-
lining the law of nature).
23 See 2 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OFJOHNJAY 1781-1782, at 396, 406 (Henry P.
Johnston ed., 1970) (claiming Americans' right to Western lands and navigation of the Missis-
sipi to be "deducible from the laws of nature").
See Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in THOMAS JEFFERSON:
WRITINGS 346-47 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (asserting a natural right to religious free-
dom).
2 See 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 3 (photo. reprint 1986) (1826) (de-
scribing the law of nations as at least in part based upon "the principles of natural law [and]
equally binding in every age and upon all mankind").
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1836),7 John Marshall (1755-1835)," George Mason (1725-92), 29
Gouverneur Morris (1752-1816), s° James Otis (1725-83),s Robert
Treat Paine (1731-1814),' 2 Josiah Quincy (1772-1864), 3 3 Tapping
Reeve (1744-1823)," 4 Joseph Story (1779-1845), 3' St. George Tucker
(1752-1827),36 Daniel Webster (1782-1806),7 Henry Wheaton (1785-
1848),"' and James Wilson (1742-98)."
These leaders were followed by many lesser lights among early
American lawyers who wrote about the law of the Republic: William
Barton (1754-1817), 4 Jesse Bledsoe (1776-1836) ,41 H. H. Bracken-
26 See 1 THE WRITINGS OF HUGH SWINTON LEGARE 276 (1845-46) (noting observance by sov-
ereigns of the law of nations and nature, despite there being no positive law to bind them).SeeJames Madison, Address to the States, in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 493-94 (Wil-
liam T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1969) (stating that rights contended for in the
American Revolution were "the rights of human nature").
28 See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 347 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting)
(referring to "writers on natural and national law, whose opinions have been viewed with pro-
found respect by the wisest men of the present, and of past ages").
29 See The Virginia Declaration of Rights, in NATURAL RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW: THE LEGACY
OF GEORGE MASON 247 (Robert P. Davidow ed., 1986) (asserting that "by nature" men have
"certain inherent rights").
20 See OBSERVATIONS ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION PUBLISHED ACCORDING TO A
RESOLUTION OF CONGRESS 50 (1779) (attributed to Morris) (proclaiming that rights of Ameri-
can colonists are due by the law of nature and the English constitution).
31 See JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (1764)
(rights guaranteed to the colonists "by the law of God and nature, by the common law, and by
act of parliament").
32 See ROBERT TREAT PAINE, THE EMPIRE OF CHARITY ESTABLISHED BY THE REVOLUTION OF
THIS CENTURY 14 (1895) (claiming "laws of Nature and of Nature's God" to be the source of
Paine's views about society and the duties of government).
23 SeeJOSIAH QUINCY, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OFJOHN QUINCY ADAMS 372-73 (1858) (discuss-
ing the troubled relation of law of nature to slavery).
See TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME 283 (Lucius E. Chittenden ed., 2d ed.
1846) (finding the duty of parents to support their children to be founded on the law of na-
ture).35 See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1375,
at 245-46 (1833) (stating constitutional prohibition of impairment of obligation of contracts
based upon "general principles of natural, or (as it is sometimes called) universal law").
36 See St. George Tucker, Appendix to Volume First. Part First, in WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1
COMMENTARIES app. 11 (1803) (arguing that "the laws of nature and of moral obligation" con-
tinue in force under all circumstances).37 3:2 THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 879 (AndrewJ. King ed., 1989) (stating that "rights
acquired by invention stand on plainer principles of natural law").
See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-4 (George Grafton Wilson ed.,
1936) (describing the law of nature as the source of the law of nations).
39 See I WORKS OFJAMES WILSON 126-47 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) (allocating a
chagter to the law of nature).
See WILLIAM BARTON, A DISSERTATION ON THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND MARINE
COMMERCE 16 (1802) (stating that "the Law of Nature comprehends all the Laws promulgated
to mankind by right reason").
41 SeeJESSE BLEDSOE, AN INTRODUCTORY LECTURE ON THE STUDY OF THE LAW, DELIVERED IN
THE CHAPEL OF TRANSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY, ON MONDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1822, at 9 (1822) (identi-
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ridge (1748-1848)," Daniel Chipman (1765-1850) , Thomas Cooper
(1759-1839), 4" Nathan Dane (1752-1835), 4 William John Duane
(1780-1865),46 John Dunlap (c.1793-1858), 7 Thomas Herttell (1771-
1849), 4" Joseph Hopkinson (1770-1842) , Charles Humphreys
(c.1775-1830),' 0 Charles Ingersoll (1782-1862),1 Benjamin James
(1768-1825)," Edward Livingston (1764-1836)," William Rawle
(1759-1836), s4 Jesse Root (1736-1822) , William Sampson (1764-
1836) ,56 James Sullivan (1744-1808) , Zephaniah Swift (1759-1823) ,58
fying "[t ] he Great Author of Nature" as the source of rules regulating conduct between people
and nations).
42 See HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE, LAW MISCELLANIES 122-24 (1814) (calling the law of na-
ture the source of any man's claim to land).
43 See DANIEL CHIPMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 61 (1822) (asserting basic
property rights to be in accord with "a principle of the common law, founded on the law of na-
ture").
44 See THOMAS COOPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LIBEL AND THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 59
(1830) (defining libel to encompass offenses against the law of nature).
45 See 6 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 626-28
(1823) (collecting legal maxims containing the law of nature).
See WILLIAM JOHN DUANE, THE LAW OF NATIONS INVESTIGATED IN A POPULAR MANNER 7
(1809) ("[U]nless the law of nature sanctions the artificial law of men or states, the latter is of
no force nor effect.").
47 SeeJOHN A. DUNLAP, THE NEW YORKJUSTICE 171 (1815) (explaining that wives are not to
be prosecuted for crimes committed under coercion by their husbands, except for crimes that
contravened the law of nature).
4 See THOMAS HERTELL, REMARKS ON THE LAW OF IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT 13-14 (1823)
(evaluating the status of imprisonment for debt under the laws of nature). Herttell also be-
lieved that the common law restrictions on the ability of married women to hold property vio-
lated the law of nature. Cf NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 116-20 (1982).
49 See JOSEPH HOPKINSON, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE LAW ACADEMY OF
PHILADELPHIA AT THE OPENING OF THE SESSION 1826-1827, at 9 (1826) (proclaiming Americans'
defense of their rights "as established and protected by the laws of nature and nations").
50 See CHARLES HUMPHREYS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE COMMON LAW IN FORCE IN KENTUCKY
488 (1822) (stating that homicide in self-defense is not to be punished because it is authorized
by the law of nature).
51 See CHARLESJARED INGERSOLL, A VIEW OF THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS, POWER AND POLICY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 78 (1808) (arguing that actions of France on the high seas
amounted to crimes against the law of nature).
52 See BENJAMIN JAMES, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA 548 (1822) (asserting tres-
pass to be a crime against the law of nature).
53 See COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINALJURISPRUDENCE 65 (1873) (ob-
serving that the law of nature is described as "innate in the mind of man" and used to test the
legality of human conduct).
54 See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 252
(1825) ("[T]he law of nature.., is implanted in us by nature itself.., and though not always
observed, never is forgotten.").
55 See 1 JESSE ROOT, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT AND SUPREME
COURT OF ERRORS, FROMJULYA.D. 1789 TOJUNE 1793, at ix-x (1798) (describing the common
law of the state of Connecticut in the same terms used to describe the law of nature).
56 See WILLIAM SAMPSON, SAMPSON'S DISCOURSE, AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH VARIOUS
LEARNED JURISTS UPON THE HISTORY OF THE LAW 9 (1826) (oudining the connection between
American law and the law of nature).
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Harry Toulmin (1766-1823),59 Timothy Walker (1802-56) ,60 and Sam-
uel Whiting (fl. 1815).61
This list should not be read to imply that all, or even any, of the
men on it had planted themselves within the traditions of Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Vattel. Still less does it show that American lawyers
rivaled the eminent Continental jurists in learning. They were com-
mon lawyers and they varied in erudition. The list shows only that
most American lawyers accepted the existence of natural law and ac-
corded it a legitimate place in their own thinking. Their acceptance
seems to have been a matter of course at the time-the existence of
the law of nature was a fact of legal life not open to serious doubt.
On the whole, Americans were consumers of juristic literature on
the law of nature, rather than its producers. Their appetite for such
literature is shown by the number of American editions of treatises
on natural law by Continental writers. Vattel's work, for example, was
printed in at least six American editions between 1780 and 1830.62
There was a market for works on natural law; it claimed a place in
many law libraries of the new Republic. Thomas Rutherforth's Insti-
tutes of Natural Law was widely read, or at least widely owned.6 s The
works of Grotius, Vattel, and Pufendorf were cited at least ninety
times in U.S. Supreme Court cases between 1789 and 1825.64 Ameri-
57 SeeJAMES SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY OF LAND TITLES IN MASSACHUSETTS 282 (1801) (claim-
ing that air, water, and sea were "given to man by the law of nature").58 See 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 7 (1795)
(describing law of nature as consisting of "general laws resulting from the original principles
and fitness of things" and established by God).
59 See HARRY TOULMIN & JAMES BLAIR, A REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 3 (1804) (maintaining that "felonious homicide is the highest
crime against the law of nature").
60 See TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW: DESIGNED AS A FIRST BOOK FOR
STUDENTS 390 (Clement Bates ed., 1895) (concluding that property rights derive from occu-
pancy based upon the law of nature).
See SAMUEL WHITING, THE CONNECTICUT TOWN-OFFICER 114 (1814) (noting that the law
of nature dictates parents' duty to support their children).
62 See 2 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW, Nos. 7186-96, at 803-06 (Morris L. Cohen
ed., 1998). Vattel's work was The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Con-
duct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, by 1860 it had been printed five more times in the
United States. See also id. at Nos. 7809-14, at 988-89 (listing six editions of Jean Jacques Bur-
lamqui's The Principles of Natural and Politic Law). See generally JUDITH HILKER, GRUNDRECHTE IM
DEUTSCHEN FRUKONSTITUTIONALISMUS 31-32, 66-70 (2005); Peter Stein, The Attraction of the
Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA. L. REV. 403 (1966), reprinted in PETER STEIN, THE
CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW 411 (1988).
63 See Gary L. McDowell, The Limits of Natural Law: Thomas Rutherforth and the American Legal
Tradition, 37 AM. J. JURIS. 57, 58 (1992) (stating that Rutherforth was "widely read and cited
among those of the Founding generation").
Lexis search undertaken Oct. 21, 2005; the search includes citations to statements made
by counsel as well as by the Justices. See 3-4 G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at
291 (1988) ("[A] rguments of counsel were regarded as themselves sources of law[.]").
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can judges, federal and state, did not hesitate to cite foreign writers
on the law of nature.65 These indications of interest and knowledge,
inconclusive as they may be singly, invite us to look more closely at
the evidence. Doing so-discovering something more about the
place of natural law in American jurisprudence and what it meant for
the history of our law and human rights-is the subject of the rest of
this Paper.
II. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE LAW OF NATURE
There can be little doubt that natural law recognized the exis-
tence of some basic human rights. The literature on this subject is
66
extensive, and I see little reason to enlarge it. I will therefore accept
this proposition as established, deferring for the moment the ques-
tion of the precise character of the rights. However, to raise the
question in terms appropriate for this Conference-Were there un-
enumerated rights in the natural law tradition?-is evidently a ques-
tion mal posse. This is so, because although natural law thinkers af-
firmed the importance of human and civil rights in various ways, they
kept no authoritative list of what those rights were. Some rights re-
curred in the treatises, but there was no catalogue. In other words,
because there was no definitive statement of enumerated rights, there
could scarcely be a compilation of unenumerated rights. It will be
both fairer and more efficient, therefore, to undertake a general in-
vestigation of the status of rights within the natural law tradition as it
appeared in early American cases. The early reports, both state and
federal, in fact provide a substantial amount of evidence on this sub-
ject.
III. AMERICAN CASES AND NATURAL LAW
Basic search services make it easier than it once was to find early
cases in which natural law was cited as being of relevance in the deci-
sion. Granted, it is impossible to be sure that it was decisive in the
See, e.g., Baring v. Reeder, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 154, 162 (1806) (referring to English
law). See generally M. H. Hoeflich, Comparative Law in Antebellum America, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REv. 535, 537 (2005) ("Early American legal culture was awash with foreign law and
interest in foreign law.").
See generally KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW, 1200-1600, at 119-64
(1993); BRiAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL
LAw AND CHURCH LAW, 1150-1625 (1997); RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES: THEIR
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT (1979); Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Canonistic Contribution to the Western
Rights Tradition: An Historical Inquiry, 33 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1991).
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 54-60 (2004) (explaining that "the framers did not include a complete list of natural
rights in the Constitution.... [because] they thought it would be impossible to do so.").
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outcome of litigation, but that uncertainty exists with almost every ci-
tation to past precedents and other authorities. We rarely know what
"really counted" with the judge. Perhaps it is right to be suspicious of
references to the law of nature. Felix Frankfurter once described
early citation of natural law as "not much more than literary garni-
ture" in John Marshall's opinions, 8 and it is true that one cannot be
certain what authority weighed most heavily with him-or with any
individual judge. But Justice Frankfurter's scoffing remark mirrors
his own opinion. It enables him to dismiss the evidence untested.69 It
is fairer to begin by taking note of situations where the law of nature
was cited and then investigate whether it seemed to do any work in
the cases. Having done so, I can also say something about how it was
used-what difference it appears to have made in the outcome of in-
dividual cases. From this survey, three conclusions of possible rele-
vance to the theme of unenumerated rights have emerged.
IV. USES OF THE LAW OF NATURE IN THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS
A first finding is that the law of nature was cited as providing a ra-
tionale for judicial decisions with a fair degree of regularity, includ-
ing cases where what we would describe as human rights were at
stake.' For instance, the principle that no one should be condemned
without being adequately summoned was ascribed to natural law and
used in attempting to quash a default judgment in a Louisiana case of
1820.71 That a person could not be compelled to swear an oath by
which he might be compelled to forfeit his own interests was ascribed
to "[s]eff-preservation... the first law of nature" in a Tennessee case
of 1808.7  The right of an illegitimate child to inherit from her
mother was buttressed by citation to the law of nature in a Connecti-
cut case of 1824.73 A guarantee of permission to leave a country in
68 Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 225 (1955);
see also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 60 (1963 ed.) (describing natural law as
"meaningless"); John Philip Reid, The Ordeal by Law of Thomas Hutchinson, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 593,
603 (1974) (reviewing BERNARD BAiLYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON (1974)) (de-
scribing natural law as "nonsense").
69 But see CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEFJUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF
LAW 100-07 (1996) (describing Marshall's dissent in Ogden v. Saunders as a careful examination
of a case reaching a different conclusion).
70 See Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 182-222 (1992) (pro-
viding examples of judicial enforcement of natural rights in Virginia, Massachusetts, New York,
and South Carolina state courts).
71 Astor v. Winter, 8 Mart. (o.s.) 171, 178 (La. 1820); see also State Bank v. Seghers, 6 Mart.
(o.s.) 724, 726 (La. 1819) (invoking "the first principles of natural law"); Bourke v. Granberry,
21 Va. (Gilmer) 16, 25 (1820) ("[A]dopt[ing] ... the golden principle, that no man ought to
be bound by a decisions to which he was not, substantially, a party.").
7 Cook v. Corn, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 340, 342 (1808).
73 Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 228, 234-35 (1824).
Jan. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
time of war was said to be accorded by the law of nature in a Massa-
chusetts decision of 1806. 74 The principle that a man could not twice
be tried for the same crime was ascribed to the law of nature in a
Pennsylvania case of 1818.7
As the essay in the previous volume by James Ely demonstrates,"
rights involving real and personal property rights were also a frequent
venue for the citation of natural law. The protection of established
property rights against injury through retrospective legislation was
accomplished, sometimes under the banner of the U.S. Constitution,
sometimes under that of natural law, sometimes under both. 7 Fair
payment for property taken by eminent domain for public purposes
was secured by invocation of the law of nature.8 The right of naviga-
tion in public waters was attributed to the law of nature. So were the
rights of the master of a ship to a share of the cargo where he had
wrecked the ship in order to save its contents.
Some unusual cases involving property rights arose in American
practice. One example is a case involving a man who, at the time of
the American Revolution, acted in defense of his family's interests by
transferring property to them in order to avoid its forfeiture when he
adhered to the enemy. When the legality of the alienation was tested
in court, the law of nature was used to justify the act. It may have
been in literal violation of the statute against fraudulent conveyances,
the judge reasoned, but the result of enforcing the statute would have
been to allow "an unjust invasion" of the party's right to own property
74 Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. (1 Tyng) 236, 239 (1806) (considering "the rules of reason, and
the~principles of natural law").
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 5 Binn. 617, 623 (Pa. 1813) (stating that it "would be a plain
violation of the great principle of natural law").
76 James w. Ely, Jr., "To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation": The Evolution of Unenumerated
Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 917 (2006).
77 See, e.g., Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 500-07 (N.Y. 1811) (referencing English com-
mon law, natural law principles, and the constitution of New Hampshire). See generally Edward
S. Corwin, The Extension ofJudicial Review in New York: 1783-1905, 15 MICH. L. REv. 281 (1917)
(constitutional grounds); J. A. C. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Do-
main, 6 Wis. L. REv. 67 (1930) (natural law); Charles Grove Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation
in the United States and the Doctrines of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations on Legislatures, 2 TEX.
L. REv. 257 (1924) (both natural law and constitutional grounds). The law of nature could also
work the other way, justifying legislation impairing a contract in order to bring the law into line
with the provisions of natural law. SeeJones v. Jones, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 2, 3-5 (1804).
78 Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 161, 166 (N.Y. 1816) (citing works by
Grotius, Pufendorf, and Bynkershoeck); Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 265
(1828) (finding the principle "laid down by writers on Natural Law, Civil Law, Common Law,
and the Law of every civilized country").
79 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71 (1821) (concluding that the air, water, and sea are com-
mon property).
80 Eppes v. Tucker, 8 Va. (4 Call) 346, 351 (1790) (basing the decision on "the rules of gen-
eral equity arising out of the laws of nature and nations").
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established under the law of nature." In other words, it seems that
the law of nature had an impact on the outcome of the case.
Probably the most poignant example of rights recognized under
the law of nature occurred in cases involving slaves. Slavery was con-
trary to natural law; this was the common learning of the jurists.82 Yet
it existed in many parts of the world, certainly including the Ameri-
can Republic. Long had it been so. Roman law provided proof of
the institution's antiquity. Like the Bible itself, Roman law stood as
an impediment to abolition. The jurists sought to bring the theory
into tolerable harmony with the facts in several ways,83 but it was obvi-
ous to them all that the natural right to freedom was being daily
abridged in quite dramatic fashion.
This being said, the natural law's recognition of the inherent right
to freedom did actually play a role in American case law. It was not a
nullity. It meant, for example, that a master could not kill his slave
and pretend that he was only destroying a chattel. He must stand
trial for murder. 4 No positive law existed in the State that extended
the master's control to life and death, it was said, and in the absence
of such a law, the natural law's presumption of human equality came
into play. The presumption came into play equally in cases involving
the movement of slaves across state lines into free territory-the
situation that would be tested in the Dred Scott case,85 and that had
earlier given rise to Somerset's Case before Lord Mansfield in Eng-
land. 6 Where the slave whose domicile had been changed chose to
81 Den ex dem. Chews v. Sparks, 1 N.J.L. 56, 64 (1791) ("The law of nature justifies every re-
sistance to an enemy."). A similar example is Den ex dem. Heirs of Campbell v. McArthur, 4
N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 552, 555-56 (1815) ("[B]y the great laws of nature ..... whenever a new
kind of government shall be adopted, those who acquire property upon the faith of the old one,
may dispose thereof and remove their persons.").
SeeJ. INST. 1.3.2. (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 5th ed. 1876) ("Slavery is an institution
of the law of nations, by which one man is made the property of another, contrary to natural
right."). For an explicit American recognition of the conflict, see Seville v. Chretien, 5 Mart.
(o.s.) 275, 288 (La. 1817). The American cases on the subject are discussed at greater length in
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 8-30 (1975).
83 See RUDOLF WEIGAND, DIE NATURRECHTSLEHRE DER LEGISTEN UND DEKRETISTEN VON
IRNERIUS BIS ACCURSIUS UND VON GRATIAN BISJOHANNES TEUTONICUS 64-78,259-82 (1967).
84 State v. Jones, I Miss. (1 Walker) 83, 85 (1820) ("The right of the master exists not by
force of the law of nature or nations, but by virtue only of the positive law of the state ....").
No positive law existed making such killing lawful, hence the court's conclusion; see also State v.
Reed, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 454, 455 (1823) ("[T]he killing a slave.., is murder."); Fields v. State, 9
Tenn. (1 Yer.) 156, 164 (1829) (regarding "Christianity [as] part of the law of the land"); Alice
Dana Adams, THE NEGLECTED PERIOD OF ANTI-SLAVERY IN AMERICA, (1808-1831) 243-46 (re-
print 1964) (1908) (reviewing these and similar cases).
85 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452-54 (1856) (deciding that a slave trans-
ported into a free state is no less a slave and not a citizen).
86 Somerset v. Stewart, (1722) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (KB.). On the contemporary significance
of this case, see generally Edward Fiddes, Lord Mansfield and the Somersett [sic] Case, 50 L.Q.
REV. 499 (1934) (exploring what Mansfield actually said in his statement), and William M.
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sue to establish his free status and was declared free, as happened,
one reason given for the result was that slavery was "without founda-
tion in the law of nature. 's No positive law recognized slavery in the
destination state, the argument went, and hence the rule favoring
freedom drawn from the law of nature applied. Lord Mansfield said
that only positive law could make lawful an institution that was con-
trary to natural law, and this argument was sometimes applied to se-
cure the freedom of the former slave.8
Of course, the law of nature did not provide a one-way street for
the vindication of human rights. It served several functions in the
American cases. Although it could be, and was, cited as a means of
protecting human rights, it could also be used to do the reverse. The
coverage of the law of nature was not limited to individuals, 89 and in-
deed it could serve to justify the diminution of individual rights. It
was held, for example, that a fundamental tenet of the law of nature
was self-preservation, and this was applied to states as well as individu-
als. One important goal of the law of nature was to secure peace and
security among individuals. This could entail the diminution of
rights of individual citizens as well as their protection, because the
government had a duty to establish good order, sometimes even at
the expense of the rights of individuals. 9 It was, for example, the jus-
tification given for confiscating the goods of a traitor, although con-
fiscation harmed the traitor's innocent children, depriving them of
Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U.
CHI. L. REv. 86 (1974) (describing the modern understanding and impact of Somerset on multi-
ple areas of law).
87 Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 470 (1820) (arguing that Lydia, a slave moved
from Kentucky to Indiana, was deemed free); see also Stanley v. Earl, 15 Ky. (5 Litt.) 281, 285
(1824) ("No man can, by the laws of nature, have dominion over his fellow-man; and property
in slaves, therefore, can only exist when the necessary means is afforded by law to enforce the
right of the master ... "); Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 36, 42-43 (1818)
(presuming that the slave's natural right to liberty prevails when a question of jurisdictional
provision of freedom is complicated by treaties and land transfers); COVER, supra note 82, at 93-
99 (discussing antislavery and the judicial process).
88 See Note, American Slavery and the Conflict of Laws, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 74, 78-79 (1971) (ex-
amining Mansfield's decision); see also Fulton v. Shaw, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 597, 599 (1827) (void-
ing an attempt to emancipate a slave while retaining her future offspring as slaves as "monstrous
both in the eye of reason and of law").
89 See Bruce P. Frohnen, The One and the Many: Individual Rights, Corporate Rights and the Di-
versity of Groups, 107 W. VA. L. REv. 789, 789-90 (2005) (advancing the argument consistent with
history that there are group rights in addition to individual rights).
90 New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 3, 6 (1799) ("It is a fundamental principle of the
law of nature and of nations, that every government is bound to preserve peace and order, to
protect individuals.... ."); see also Broh v.Jenkins, 9 Mart. (o.s.) 526, 528-30 (La. 1821) (consid-
ering first "the laws of nature and of nations" regarding possession of property); Dulany v.
Wells, 3 H. & McH. 20, 23 (Md. 1790) (determining debt obligations during the American
Revolution).
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property they would inherit except for their parent's fault.9' It re-
quired men to give up the right, one which they had by the law of na-
ture, to recover property owed to them.92
Some of its negative effect was indirect. The law of nature was
thus cited to dismiss the claims of American Indians to lands they
used for hunting, it being held by the natural lawyers that dominion
93
over land required more than such intermittent use. The law of na-
94ture was cited to restrict a right to marry, since there could be no
right to contract a marriage that itself violated natural law. It could
also be invoked indirectly in denying a right to devise, alienate or in-
herit land, since it was assumed that "[t]he right of transmitting
property by descent ... is not derived from the law of nature; but
from the positive and arbitrary laws of civil society[.]" 95 The very in-
determinacy of the law of nature could be used to demonstrate the
legitimacy of social legislation.
V. THE CHARACTER OF RIGHTS IN THE LAW OF NATURE
A second finding is that the law of nature did not lend itself to a
clear statement of individual rights. It furnished statements of fun-
damental principles that could serve as the source of human rights,
but there was no definitive list of what the rights were, neither in the
cases nor in the treatises. Natural law's application to specific cases
could therefore present uncertainties. It spawned disagreement
among contemporary lawyers. The rights found in natural law trea-
tises were usually stated in quite general terms-the right to preserve
one's self or to alienate property, for example. And the law of nature
admitted the legitimacy of regulation and limitation of the rights it
granted, at least where a plausible reason existed. The exact legal ef-
91 E.g., Lessee of Pemberton v. Hicks, 1 Binn. 1, 18 (Pa. 1799) ("[A]s self-preservation is the
first law of nature, so it is likewise the first law of society.").
92 Blair v. Williams, 14 Ky. (7 A.K. Marsh.) 34, 36-41 (1823) (determining that "the legal
obligation of a contract.... is the mere creature of civil institutions .... and may be taken
away at pleasure by human laws").
3 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 569 (1823) ("The measure of property ac-
quired by occupancy is determined, according to the law of nature, by the extent of men's
wants and their capacity of using it to supply them."); see also Thompson v. Johnston, 6 Binn. 68,
76 (Pa. 1813) ("[F]or the cultivation of the soil will support a greater population, than a life by
hunting, and therefore this mode of life is less according to the law of nature.").
Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 358, 378-79 (1810) (dictum) (prohibiting mar-
riages "incestuous by the law of nature"); see alsoJones v. Jones, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 2, 5-6 (1804)
(granting a divorce).
95 Jackson v. Wood, 7 Johns. 290, 293-94 (N.Y. 1810). See generally SAMUEL PUFENDORF, 2
ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LIBRI Duo 37-38 (William Abbott Oldfather
trans., 1931) (1692) (explaining how goods are to be divided among sons).
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fect of some of them was subject to disagreement among the jurists.96
Usury was said to be contrary to the law of nature, for instance, but
influential jurists thought that a taking of a reasonable rate of interest
might nevertheless be justified.7 So it appeared in American cases.
To take an example important at the time of the American Revo-
lution, it was asked: Did the law of nature guarantee a right of expa-
triation and emigration? It might be so read, but the answer was far
from certain. Grotius could be cited in support of a general rule al-
lowing freedom of movement, but he also admitted the existence of
exceptions to it.99 American cases themselves did not provide a clear
answer; some regulation by the state was clearly admissible and even
the existence of the underlying right was subject to dispute. 00
The situation was not unusual.'0 One cannot help feeling some
sympathy with the exasperated federal judge faced with an argument
that the natural law required him to ignore the positive law's distinc-
tion between transitory and local actions in defining the reach of fed-
eraljurisdiction. "Who yet," he said, "has been able to find where the
law of nature has defined what a civil action is, or directed the mode
of proceeding in it, or in what court it should be brought[?]' ',0 2 He
was not prepared to deny natural law's existence, but he did not
One locus classicus in the medieval law was provided by the papal decretal, Raynutius,
placed in the Decretales Gregorii IX (X 3.26.16) in 2 CORPUS IURIS CANONICI 544 (Aemilius
Friedberg ed., 1879) (concerning the dispute over the validity of depriving the heir of a portion
of the estate due by the law of nature).
97 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DEJURE BELLI AC PACIs LIBRI TRES Lib. II, c. 12, § 20, at 355 (Francis W.
Kelsey trans., 1925) (stating the "generally accepted opinion that interest is forbidden by the
law of nature"). See generally CARLO GAMBA, LICITA USURA: GIURISTI E MORA1ISTI TRA MEDIOEVO
ED ETA MODERNA (2003).
98 E.g., Dunham v. Gould, 16 Johns. 367, 377-78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819) (citing the opinion of
Grotius).
GROTIUS, supra note 97, c. 5, § 24, at 253-54. The source of this reference was Professor
Kenneth Pennington.
100 Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 138-46 (1795) (considering disputes about the ex-
tent of expatriation as a natural right in time of war); Brooks v. Clay, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 545,
549 (1821) (containing the judge's refusal to be drawn into discussion of disputed question, as
invited by litigant); Ainslie v. Martin, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 454, 461 (1813) (stating that "no subject
can expatriate himself"); Read v. Read, 9 Va. (5 Call) 160, 201 (1804) (comparing English com-
mon law with "a great natural right; I mean the right of expatriation").
101 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Hayden, 6 Conn. 453, 457 (1827) (specifying that the right of self-
defense was a "primary law of nature" but subject to many qualifications).
102 Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 F. Cas. 660, 663 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8411). The District
Judge was John Tyler, father of President John Tyler. See also Livingston v. Heerman, 9 Mart.
(o.s.) 656, 667 (La. 1821) (posing "[qiuestions which the general and immutable law of nature
cannot always solve"); Martin v. Woods, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 377, 381 (1812) (commenting by law-
yer about rejection of "whatever fanciful theories the writers upon natural law may have in-
vented on the subject" of citizenship); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cal. 175, 181 (N.Y. 1805) (Livingston,
J., dissenting) (having "great difficulty in determining" the role of natural law in a property dis-
pute concerning hunted animals).
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think it of much help to him in reaching a result in the case before
him.
Even in places where there was evident compatibility, the exact
reach of natural law's principles could be quite uncertain. A text-
book example was the duty to fulfill one's promises. The duty was
held to be part of natural law, and the corresponding right in the
promisee to secure enforcement of the contract was undoubted.
Common lawyers admitted, however, that this was a duty that might
legitimately be modified by the law's recuirement of valuable consid-
eraton to make a promise enforceable. Exactly that had happened
in the common law. Similarly, the natural law held that parents had a
duty to support and bring up their children. Even the behavior of
most animals showed that care for one's offspring was a natural duty.
The children had a corresponding right to be supported by their par-
ents. However, this was simply a very broad statement of principle.
What did it mean in practice? Jurists held that additional circum-
stances could justify diminishing the scope of this right. Assuming a
good reason, a statute might validly cut down the amount of support
owed to children without running afoul of the law of nature. Jurists,
therefore, held that the natural right to parental support was not ab-
solute. It could give way to necessity, convenience, or even long-
established custom.1 04 And so it was with many of the rights found in
the law of nature.
1
0
5
This did not mean that natural law was meaningless, or that it had
no possible effect in practice, only that it was not very specific and was
subject to limitations.
103 Schoonmaker v. Roosa, 17 Johns. 301, 304 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820) ("[E]very man is, by the
law of nature, bound to fulfil his engagements. It is equally true that the law of this country sup-
plies no means.., to compel the performance of an agreement made without sufficient con-
sideration." (quoting an English case, Rann v. Hughes, (1778) 7 Term. Rep. 350); see also Sum-
ner v. Williams, 8 Mass. (7 Tyng) 162, 188 (1811) (also citing the preceding passage from Rann
v. Hughes).
104 An example, with judicial acknowledgement, is found in Wilkes v. Rogers, 6Johns. 566, 579
(N.Y. 1810), which explains that if a parent seeks to extinguish her duty of maintenance to her
children out of necessity it can be recognized by the court. See also Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 228,
232 (1824) (repeating the convenient law that "the rights of an illegitimate child are very few");
Steele v. Thacher, 22 F. Cas. 1204, 1207 (D. Me. 1825) (No. 13,348) (explaining the custom that
a parent may generally prohibit others from contracting with their child, but that this rule was
inapplicable when the parent no longer honors the child's natural right of parental support).
5 Other examples include:
(1) The law of usury. It was held to be contrary to the law of nature, but lenders were al-
lowed to receive interest nonetheless "provided their exactions do not become oppressive."
Bank of Utica v. Wager, 2 Cow. 712, 765 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824);
(2) The power of alienating property. It was said that "the right of disposing of property in-
ter vivos is derivable from the law of nature ... yet the extent in which it may be exercised in
different countries is not settled[J" Dawes v. Head, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 128, 132 (1825).
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The Golden Rule proves useful in our own lives, even if it is stated
broadly and contains exceptions. It was the same with the law of na-
ture. For instance, natural law was commonly cited, and apparently
with good effect, as a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation. Fol-
lowing the same theme of a child's rights to parental support, for in-
stance, a statute favoring the rights of dependent children would be
given an expansive construction, whereas one restricting those same
rights was to be given a narrow reading. At least in the world of the
European ius commune, judges had quite considerable freedom in in-
terpreting statutes, and crediting the law of nature, as they did, they
had freedom to apply natural law to the statutes they interpreted.
Much the same can be said about the interpretation of contracts that
came before them, for it was assumed by the natural lawyers that
"[e]very contract must be subjected to, limited, and interpreted by
the law of nature [.]1 , 6 By such means natural law made itself felt in
the decision of cases.
VI. NATURAL LAW RIGHTS AND POSITIVE LAW
A third result of this survey is finding that the law of nature nor-
mally played a subsidiary role in the American cases. For the most
part, it was cited to support other sources of law, or at least in con-
junction with them, rather than to oppose or invalidate them. True
enough, natural law could be used to test the validity of a specific law,
custom, or statute. It could challenge positive law. 17 In other words,
it could serve as the U.S. Constitution generally does today: a rubric
under which courts determine whether a statute passes muster.
However, this is not the role the law of nature normally played in
early American case law. Mostly it was cited to buttress other sources
of law, not to overturn them. Thus, we read that a legal position was
endorsed "by the law of nature, as well as the municipal law,, 10 8 or
that another was supported "by the principles of common law, as well
as the law of nature."0 9 A North Carolina judge asserted that his
106 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 155 (1819).
107 For example, that is the role it played in the Doctor and Student of Christopher St. German
(c. 1460-1540). See St. German's Doctor and Student, 91 SELDEN SOC. PUB. 77, 79 (T.F.T. Plucknett
&J.L. Barton eds., 1974) ("So in lyke wyse the generall groundes of the lawe of Englande/ hede
more what is good for many/ than what is good for one synguler person only."). For further
scholarly discussion, see Mark D. Walters, St. German on Reason and Parliamentary Sovereignty, 62
CAMB. L.J. 335 (2003).
108 Wilkes, 6 Johns. at 579. This finding accords with that of R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 262-64 (2001), which discusses how
"judicial references to natural law" were often "harnessed to specific constitutional provisions"
in a "mix of natural and positive law."
109 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 167 (1820) (Livingston,J., dissenting); see
also Canaan v. Salisbury, 1 Root 155, 156 (Conn. 1790) ("[T]he laws of [the] state ... [are]
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views were confirmed by "the Common Law, [which is] founded
upon the law of nature, and confirmed by revelation." "° The substan-
tive identity of the law of nature with the law of nations was frequently
asserted. 1 ' Such recitations could go to considerable lengths; in an
1804 U.S. Supreme Court case, the Court declared that the lawyer's
position was endorsed by "the divine law, the law of nature, the law of
nations, or the constitution of the state of NewJersey."
2
This third finding may seem surprising, even disappointing, in the
context of a study concerning the status of unenumerated rights in
the early American Republic. One expects the normal case to be one
in which a statute or other local law was tested against the natural law.
But on looking, one finds the reverse: the normal case was one in
which a statute was supported by the law of nature. The U.S. Consti-
tution's provisions were, of course, sometimes assumed to overlap
with those of the law of nature,' 3 but so too were the rules of the
common law and even the provisions of statutes. In other words, the
lawyers citing natural law seem to have assumed congruity between it
and other sources of law.
In fact, this finding should not be wholly surprising. It made good
sense at the time, when the ordinary assumption of the natural law-
yers was that positive law was consistent with the natural law. The
former added specificity and sanctions to the latter. This left ample
room for choice as to specific provisions, but natural law was meant
to underlie positive law. Ordinarily it did. The assumption of sub-
agreeable to the law of nature ... ."); Haven v. Foster, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 112, 119 (1829) (find-
ing that "the law of nature, the civil law, and [the state law]" all favor the same result); Page v.
Pendleton, Wythe 211, 214 (Va. 1793) (citing remedies provided by the legislative authority
which the laws of nature permit).
110 State v. Reed, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 454, 455 (1823).
III E.g., Thirty Hogshead of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) ("The law of
nations is the great source from which we derive those rules.., which are recognized by all civi-
lized and commercial states.. .."); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,
94 (1804) (referring to "the law of nature and nations"); Hinchman v. Clark, 1 N.J.L. 340, 361
(1795) (noting the "government professedly founded upon the rights of human nature"). Join-
ing the two was encouraged by the jurists. See generally 2J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF
NATURAL LAw, 151-61 (Nugent trans., 5th ed. 1791); MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE
CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1870-1960, at 30-33 (2002).
112 M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 324 (1804); see also Glass v. The Sloop
Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 6, 14 (1794) (contemplating lawful regulation "by common law, by stat-
ute law, and by the law of nature and nations"); Griffith v. Griffith's Ex'rs, 4 H. & McH. 101, 115
(Md. 1798) ("The common law is grounded upon the general customs of the realm, and com-
prehends the law of nature, the law of God, and the principles and maxims of the law."); The
Charge to the GrandJury (1765), inJOSIAH QUINCY,JR., REPORT OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OFJUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 110, 113 (Bos-
ton 1865) ("Common Law, Natural Law, that is, the Law which every man has implanted in him,
[and] directly against a Law of this Province[.]").
113 E.g., Blair v. Williams, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 34, 90 (1823) (rejecting a possible reading of the
.obligation of contracts" clause because it would conflict with tenets of natural law).
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stantive compatibility between natural law and positive law is some-
thing legal historians should have noted more often than they have.
However, they began by asking whether a lawyer's arguments were
based upon the common law or on natural law. One may recall, for
example, the strenuous efforts made to determine whether Sir Ed-
ward Coke's famous account of Bonham's Case depended upon appli-
cation of traditional rules of English law or instead of a supra-
national, higher law.114 At first sight, that approach seems to make
sense."' From the perspective of the natural lawyers of Coke's day,
however, it would not have been a necessary choice. They assumed
that the two sources of law were in harmony. Certainly Coke did. He
thought the English common law was the embodiment of reason. It
would have seemed entirely natural to him to use both in supporting
the result of the case. Thus, modern writers have seen the necessity
for choice where Coke and lawyers in the new Republic saw none, re-
quiring no artifice to "blend" the dual doctrines."' To do so was
characteristic of the thought of lawyers schooled in the law of nature.
Of course, conflict could exist between natural law and positive
law. There is language in the tradition proclaiming the invalidity of
any law not in harmony with the law of nature, and some of it seems
to invite judicial review of legislation. Butjudicial review was not part
of the traditions of natural law"' and in practice it rarely served that
function in the new Republic. Judges did not invalidate statutes sim-
ply because they did not accord with the dictates of natural law. What
Justice Iredell said in Calder v. Bull is confirmed by a survey of the
cases that cited the dictates of natural law: Judges may not declare a
legislative act "to be void, merely because it is, in theirjudgment, con-
trary to the principles of natural justice.""" That had been the rule in
114 E.g., S. E. Thorne, The Constitution and the Courts: A Reexamination of the Famous Case of Dr.
Bonham, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 15, 21 (Conyers Read ed., 1938) (concluding
that "[f]ar from 'evincing a receptive and candid attitude toward natural law ideas.. .', the ar-
gument is derived from the ordinary common-law rules of statutory interpretation"). For a
strong example in the American context, see John Phillip Reid, The Irrelevance of the Declaration,
in LAW IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION IN THE LAW 46, 47-87 (Hendrik
Hartog ed., 1981).
15 This approach is encouraged by the influential work of J. C. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT
CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAw (Cambridge Univ. Press 1987) (1957) (discussing the his-
tory of English common law and stating that the English people, quite differently than the
French, believed in the existence of this one type of law alone).
116 J. A. C. Grant, The "Higher Law"Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 WIS. L. REV. 67,
82-83 (1930) (discussing how courts combined "the doctrines of natural law and due process").
117 This reading of the evidence accords with the conclusions of Helen K. Michael, The Role of
Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of
"Unwritten" Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421, 427-35 (1991) (arguing that judicial review
was traditionally never viewed as a check on governmental infringement of the individual rights
granted by natural law).
114 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 399 (1798).
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England where the judges did not stand above the King in Parlia-
ment.ll9
It might conceivably be otherwise in the new American republic.
Indeed, it would come to be different, and some believed that it
should be so from the outset. A written constitution laid out rules
and principles that bound legislatures and courts alike. Surely, it
could be said, the Constitution ought to prevail over statutes, and
judges were empowered to see that this principle prevailed. This is a
change made possible by what the Germans call Positivierung des
Naturrechts. It altered the rules from those that had prevailed under
the law of nature before it was put into written, constitutional form
and led slowly to judicial review as we know it.
However, the origins and history of judicial review in the United
States are not the subject of this Paper. It is a complicated ques-
tion.2" From the perspective of the law of nature dominant at the
turn of the nineteenth century, it would have been too great a leap
for a judge to have "struck down" an act of the legislature simply be-
cause he regarded it as inconsistent with principles derived from the
law of nature.' Doing so would have been inconsistent with preva-
lent understanding of what the law of nature authorized, and Ameri-
can judges do not appear to have taken that step. They needed
more. The most that can be said is that, when our written Constitu-
tion was added to the mix, acceptance of the tenets of the law of na-
ture may have contributed to an expanded role in the protection of
civil rights played by American judges. In this sense, natural law
helped in paving the way for the protection of constitutional rights in
our Republic.
119 See WILLIAM BLACKSONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *91 (asserting that to give judges the power to
reject a statute would be "subversive of all government").
120 Gordon S. Wood, Judicial Review in the Era of the Founding, in Is THE SUPREME COURT THE
GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION? 153, 153 (Robert A. Licht ed., 1993) (comparing influence of
the founding era and the post-Civil War period); see also William Michael Treanor, Judicial Re-
view Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457 (2005) (presenting "a view of judicial review in
the founding era that is sharply different from all the varying schools of thought, both with re-
spect to the frequency of judicial review and with respect to when it was exercised"). The au-
thor has had the advantage of reading a draft of the forthcoming book by Philip Hamburger,
LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY, which makes a significant contribution to understanding this subject
in the new United States.
121 See, e.g., Lapsley v. Brashears, 14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 46, 50-52 (1823) (contrasting the nature of
government in the United States with that of lands without a written constitution); Bennett v.
Boggs, 3 F. Cas. 221, 227-28 (C.C.D. N.J. 1830) (No. 1319) (rejecting the possibility of applying
"general principles" to declare a law void unless the right could be found in the words of the
Constitution).
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VII. CONCLUSION
A conclusion appropriate for a Symposium devoted to unenumer-
ated rights based on the evidence presented in this Paper must be a
modest one. There are two points worth making. The first is that the
traditions of natural law did contain rights that were not (and are
not) found in American constitutions and amendments to them. For
example, the right to parental support, a staple of the natural law, is
not found in the U.S. Constitution. The right to self-preservation,
another accepted part of learned traditions, also was regarded as the
source of natural rights that did not appear expressly in our constitu-
tions. Of course, there was a considerable overlap between the law of
nature and American constitutions. There was bound to be. And as
Mark Tushnet's contribution points out, much depends on how spe-
cifically one defines the right.
Rights to due process of law furnish an example of this relation-
ship. Overall, one must say that the U.S. Constitution was more de-
tailed about them than was the law of nature. The right to a jury trial
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment, for example, granted a spe-
cific right the natural lawyers would have said might be consistent
with natural law, and perhaps founded upon it, but they would not
have said trial by jury was required by the law of nature. Only proce-
dural fairness was. The "fit" between the law of nature and the
American Constitution was always imperfect. It can be said that rights
existed within the natural law tradition that are nowhere mentioned
in the Constitution, and that rights were stated in the Constitution
that were debatable under the law of nature. To this extent the his-
tory of natural rights gives a certain amount of encouragement to the
future recognition of unenumerated rights as they are not a wholly
new feature of our law.
The second conclusion seems at least partially at odds with the
first. The rights endorsed in the law of nature, as it was understood
in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, were considerably
weaker than American constitutional rights have turned out to be.71
They were stated with greater generality, admitted more exceptions
and limitations, and served as the source of judicial invalidation of
statutes only in the most extreme and unusual situations. The natu-
ral lawyers argued that the law of nature was a fundamental law. In a
sense it was thus a "higher law" than was positive law. Sometimes they
1 Mark Tushnet, Can You Watch Unenumerated Rights Dift?, 9 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 209 (2006).
123 See Gerald Stourzh, Fundamental Laws and Individual Rights in the 18th Century Constitution,
in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 159, 169-70 (J.
Barlow et al. eds., 1988) (distinguishing between "fundamentalizing" individual rights, as was
done in the English tradition, and the American tradition of "constitutionalizing" of rights so
that they "cannot be abrogated or changed by normal legislative procedure").
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did speak of statutes that ran afoul of this principle as unlawful and
not to be obeyed, at least in the forum of the individual's conscience.
But more often they found room for positive law's place within the
spacious chambers of the natural law traditions, and they recoiled
from the conclusion that individual judges could themselves take the
part of a legislator and decide exactly what specific results the rule of
law demanded.
To this extent, the history of rights in the natural law tradition ac-
tually gives less encouragement to judicial recognition of unenumer-
ated rights than appears at first sight. The rights that can be sup-
ported by the natural law standards so widely recognized at the time
of our Republic's founding were indeed not identical with all of those
enumerated in our Constitution. However, they were different in
character from what most people today mean when they speak of
fundamental rights guaranteed by the exercise ofjudicial review.
